[discuss] Roadmap for globalizing IANA

Tue Mar 4 14:42:31 UTC 2014

Keep in mind, Marilyn, that DNSA does not make policy, ICANN would continue to do that. DNSA is operational.
Thus, your concept of “safeguards from participation from stakeholders” is out of place in this context.
All stakeholders would continue to be represented in ICANN’s policy development process, as they (more or less) are now.

From: Marilyn Cade [mailto:marilynscade at hotmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 6:53 AM
To: Nii Narku Quaynor
Cc: Milton L Mueller; discuss at 1net.org
Subject: Re: [discuss] Roadmap for globalizing IANA

I will have to study the ideas further but this seems like a sort of "trade association" approach which will lack safeguards from participation from stakeholders. However. I agree that accountability measures are vitally important and have to be addressed and tested before changes are made. ,

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 4, 2014, at 5:13, "Nii Narku Quaynor" <quaynor at ghana.com<mailto:quaynor at ghana.com>> wrote:
Hi Milton

Thanks for the responses

I think if the objective is to remove USG then the proposal should focus on that and not address what you mentioned "not letting ICANN get too powerful"

The USG could delegate the functions to the three organizations IETF/Verisign/ICANN involved and be done

The creation of DNSA creates yet more participation problems for developing country ccs having to attend both ICANN and DNSA

Thanks and regards
Nii

On Mar 4, 2014, at 2:43, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu<mailto:mueller at syr.edu>> wrote:
Nii, thanks for your questions. Most of them are actually answered in the paper itself, but I will answer your questions directly.

>Why is removing USG not mean just that? End of contract

First, it would be the end of 2 contracts, not one. ICANN and Verisign. You cannot just end the IANA functions contract.

Second, both contracts contain serious accountability measures. However wrongly conceived the idea of unilateral U.S. oversight is, how do we ensure that the root zone is managed properly and what is the recourse if the root zone managers are either negligent, incompetent or corrupt? What do you replace the IANA contract with?

The reason for a DNSA is that registries have the strongest incentive to get root zone management right. It is their data that the root zone contains. To ensure impartial administration we create a nondiscriminatory right to own DNSA to all registries?

> What problem is being solved by combining functions from other organizations to
> create another entity dnsa?

As noted above: 1) accountability problem; 2) incentives problem. To which we can add: not letting ICANN get too powerful.

>The proposed Dnsa is potentially a consortium of 1000+ registries and how would this work.

Not that many companies involved. More like a few hundred; lots of companies have multiple TLDs. Ownership shares might be based on some metric of size, such as names under registration, etc.

How does GNSO work? How does ccNSO work? How did Intelsat work? (consortium of ~200 national telecom operators). How did Nominet work? (shared ownership by many registrars) How does IEEE work? (hundreds of thousands of members).

>Is this different from creating another ICANN

Very different. ICANN is for making policy. It involves representation of diverse stakeholders and a complicated process for developing consensus on policy and approval by the board. DNSA is for operations. Most people I have talked to agree that we need to keep those things separate. So, we separate them

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