[discuss] Thoughts welcome on proposed Netmundial submission
Peter Dengate Thrush
barrister at chambers.gen.nz
Sun Mar 2 10:41:51 UTC 2014
On 28/02/2014, at 6:00 PM, John Curran wrote:
> On Feb 27, 2014, at 7:32 PM, Ian Peter <ian.peter at ianpeter.com> wrote:
> Ian -
> Very nice writeup... I have just a couple of comments, which you may use or
> discard as desired.
>> This roadmap suggests that the IANA functions, though necessary processes in the secure and authoritative functioning of the Internet, no longer need a separate entity and would more productively merged with similar function
>> under the auspices of ICANN.
To me, this substantially misses the major point, and appears confused about the current set up.
IANA functions do not have a separate entity - they are are a set of functions performed already by ICANN.
That means they are already a function under the auspices of ICANN.
THE issue in play is that ICANN performs these functions under a contract from the USG.
The issue is that this contract provides the USG with an unequal advantage compared with other government, and all other IG actors.
Making progress on this issue means removing the contract, and the contractual relationship that it creates. The USG originally signaled in Clinton's time that it would complete a handover to the NewCo of the White Paper, once it was built. One avenue is therefor to return to the USG and say that ICANN has now become the trusted global body envisaged by the White Paper, and that transfer should now be done.
How that gets done is important - there should be no opportunity for US politicians to argue that the Administration "gave away the Internet".
Time in Singapore and Brazil should productively focus on the mechanisms by which this transition should occur.
I have suggested several in the past - eg treating the IANA functions as "trust" property, with ICANN as Trustee. If necessary, the USG could retain a role settlor of the Trust, with the power to appoint trustees - not a huge distance from the current (contractual) situation, but a lot better in practice. ICANN would "own" IANA, the beneficiaries would be the Internet community. The terms of the trust would include that ICANN operate IANA under DNS directions frm ICANN, etc etc etc.
Or, the USG could "assign" the IANA functions, with a security ( like a mortgage) over them. The terms of the mortgage would be the similar to the obligations in the Trust deed above.
This would allow the USG to exercise a right of re-entry if the terms of the mortgage were breached.
These arrangements need to satisfy both masters - the global internet community, looking for a way to lessen the USG role and US politicians who see the Internet (wrongly) as a US fief.
The solution should be very long term, so that there is stability.
> It is an interesting formulation of the problem statement... At present, I would describe
> the IANA functions as "a set of tasks" rather than an "entity", and hence would instead
> phrase the purpose of a roadmap as:
> "This roadmap suggests that the IANA functions (which are necessary for the secure
> and proper functioning of the Internet) that are currently administered by ICANN per
> USG contract should remain at ICANN and be performed instead under its auspices
> via the strengthening of accountability mechanisms to meet the global public interest.
but this is a non-sequitur.
Improving the accountability mechanisms ( a most worthy goal, which needs to be built in to the DNA) wont keep the IANA functions at ICANN.
1 - they are already at ICANN and there is no suggestion they should be moved, and 2. they are there under a contract, which is the root cause of the problem.
Nor will improving accountability keep them being performed under ICANN auspices, if the USG decides to re-let the contract, or take the functions in-house.
>> Subject of course to many concerns about details, this direction appears to have widespread support from governments, civil society, technical community, and private sector.
>> In order to achieve this desired change efficiently and productively, the following roadmap is proposed.
>> 1. ICANN should be requested to prepare a proposal for management of the previous IANA functions within the ICANN multistakeholder model
ICANN manages the IANA within the MSM.
Under the terms of the SOW there has to be functional separation inside ICANN between the policy making and the implementation, but IANA is inside ICANN.
>> bearing in mind the following criteria:
>> (a) protection of the root zone from political or other improper interference;
> The above criteria confuses me - are we referring to ICANN's DNS policy development role,
> or performance of the IANA functions? The latter are technical tasks in registry administration
> and the most important criteria would be that ICANN continue to implement all IANA registry
> functions in accordance with the respective policies (I guess one could further elaborate to
> point out that operating per respective policies means free from political or other interference,
> but that really is secondary to making sure that the IANA follows IETF protocol, RIR IP, and
> ICANN DNS policies, both presently adopted and as revised in the future.)
What is needed is cut and paste from the SOW with NTIA, so that these controls (worth and necessary) which are there are captured are continued in the new ( non-contractual) instrument, plus a community debate about the appropriateness of new and other controls.
Another topic that should be prominent on the agenda's in Singapore and Brazil.
> That's it - thanks again for sending this!
> Disclaimer: My views alone.
> discuss mailing list
> discuss at 1net.org
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the discuss