[discuss] Roadmap for globalizing IANA

Wed Mar 5 17:23:36 UTC 2014

I am not convinced. Regarding 4, your model seems so expansive and 
expensive that I find it hard to imagine that Verisign's bill would 
exceed its cost in the long run.

Regarding 1 and 2, if the IANA function is indeed stripped off all 
policy discretion, shouldn't it be possible to devise a contract that 
makes it more or less irrelevant if the contracting partner is a huge 
DNSA apparatus or just one organization?
One could combine the contract-based model with a supervisory board that 
ensures compliance and takes care of complaints.

 > A good question, actually.

Thank you for the 'actually'
jeanette

Am 05.03.2014 17:52, schrieb Milton L Mueller:
>
>
> -----Original Message----- From: Jeanette Hofmann
> [mailto:jeanette at wzb.eu]
>> Milton, I have a perhaps naive question. If the DNSA has no policy
>> role but only carries out policy decisions that have already been
>> made elsewhere what exactly is the difference between the newly
>> formed DNSA and Verisign? In other words, what is the specific
>> improvement that DNSA would provide compared to Verisign?  I mean a
>> Verisign no longer tied by a contract with NTIA.
>

>
> A Verisign-run DNSA without a cooperative agreement with NTIA? There
> are many differences.
>
> First, a DNSA with co-ownership by many other registries would ensure
> that VRSN did not do anything discriminatory in its implementation,
> and also that it would be as attentive to the needs of other
> registries as to its own needs. Second, DNSA as a form of "collective
> bargaining" with ICANN regarding the substance of the implementation
> contract would allow the contract to be a better check and balance
> against overbearing exercises of contractual power by ICANN in its
> registry agreements. Third, a broader DNSA might decide to
> incorporate outside of the USA, although it should not be allowed to
> incorporate anywhere without strong antitrust institutions and free
> expression guarantees, which may limit it to North America or Europe
> in practice. Fourth, if one registry (Verisign or anyone else)
> provides the function they will eventually demand to get paid for it;
> if it is VRSN alone, they might overstate the costs and get paid via
> ICANN which is known to be flush with cash. If it is a group of
> registries taxing themselves, I suspect cost-minimization would be
> the order of the day.
>
>
>
>
> Personally I have no clear opinion on the number of organizations
> necessary or desirable to produce a reliable and fully accountable
> IANA function. Following the discussions here I ask myself whether we
> are slowly moving towards a constitutionalization of the entire CIR
> area, including all I* orgs.
>
> jeanette
>
>
>
> Am 05.03.2014 04:52, schrieb Milton L Mueller:
>> These charges of fox guarding henhouse are just uninformed, I think
>> they are knee-jerk reactions based on the false perception that
>> DNSA makes policy. It doesn't. I've talked with a lot of people
>> about this and have learned that lots of them are so used to the
>> combination of policy making and IANA DNS functions in ICANN that
>> they find it difficult not to conflate root zone implementation and
>> operation with the policy process.
>>
>> But that is exactly the conflation we are trying to eliminate
>> institutionally -- and mentally.
>>
>> Please tell me how 100+ registries collectively manage to eat the
>> chickens when they have a binding contract with ICANN to do nothing
>> but implement policy, when their ambitions check each other, and
>> when, as an organization of incumbent registries, they are subject
>> to huge antitrust liability if they manipulate the functions to
>> exploit monopoly power to enlarge their profits. Those are not
>> serious threats.
>>
>> The real difficulties here are working out the governance structure
>> among the registries. There might be intelligent concerns about
>> that, and how long it would take. But I think those problems can be
>> overcome if people support the basic model.
>>
>> The idea that the DNSA needs "multistakeholder oversight" is mostly
>> recursive nonsense. One could just as well call for
>> multistakeholder oversight of the overseers. And so on. Are not
>> hundreds of registries, from all countries of the world, from
>> private and public sector, from profit and nonprofit, from various
>> business models, enough stakeholders? Anyway, multistakeholder
>> representation makes sense as a policy development method, not as a
>> way of controlling technical operations.
>>
>> Of course, nothing stops a multistakeholder review process from
>> deciding that the DNSA was derelict in its duty, and calling for
>> breach of contract. But that's policy, isn't it?
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message----- From: discuss-bounces at 1net.org
>> [mailto:discuss-bounces at 1net.org] On Behalf Of Shatan, Gregory S.
>> Sent: Tuesday, March 4, 2014 12:58 PM To: 'Adam Peake' Cc:
>> discuss at 1net.org Subject: Re: [discuss] Roadmap for globalizing
>> IANA
>>
>> Adam:
>>
>> Don't worry, I haven't dismissed the proposal out of hand.  I'm
>> still chewing on it.
>>
>> You mention the concern about "predictable and reliable service" --
>> do you know of any instances where the current set-up has failed to
>> provide that?
>>
>> I think the point about diversity of registries is an important
>> one. In addition to those you mention, there are the ".brand"
>> registries as well, who would provide yet another voice.  (I assume
>> these would be included, even though they are not mentioned
>> specifically in the proposal.  To the extent these are "single
>> registrant" gTLDs, the "weighting" issue is interesting.  (Of
>> course, there may be non-.brand single registrant TLDs as well (I
>> think I saw a couple of applications where the users were not
>> really "registrants" of SLDs ).)
>>
>> Greg
>>
>> -----Original Message----- From: Adam Peake
>> [mailto:ajp at glocom.ac.jp] Sent: Tuesday, March 04, 2014 12:32 PM
>> To: Shatan, Gregory S. Cc: 'joseph alhadeff'; discuss at 1net.org
>> Subject: Re: [discuss] Roadmap for globalizing IANA
>>
>>
>> Hi Greg,
>>
>> On Mar 5, 2014, at 1:49 AM, Shatan, Gregory S. wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> The popular term for this might be "the fox guarding the
>>> henhouse."  Of course, if it is merely "operational," then
>>> perhaps the concern is overblown.  But if these functions are
>>> merely operational, why not just leave them at ICANN?
>>>
>>
>>
>> Not sure about "fox guarding the henhouse"...  These functions are
>> essential to the registries' business.  As Milton keeps reminding
>> us, it's operational, they need predictable and reliable service.
>>
>> The diversity of registries is quite positive, very different
>> business models (from com to new community tlds), different
>> stakeholders and particularly sponsoring entities (for profit,
>> ccTLD, government, IGO, NGO), geographic diversity (though even
>> with around 25% ccTLD not as balanced as we'd hope), even
>> language.
>>
>> I think it's worth looking at the merits of the proposal.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Adam
>>
>>
>>> Greg Shatan
>>>
>>> From: discuss-bounces at 1net.org [mailto:discuss-bounces at 1net.org]
>>> On Behalf Of joseph alhadeff Sent: Tuesday, March 04, 2014 9:55
>>> AM To: discuss at 1net.org Subject: Re: [discuss] Roadmap for
>>> globalizing IANA
>>>
>>> While I am not as well versed in these issues and their history
>>> of some of the more frequent commentators, it would seem that
>>> accountability is often benefited by and predicated on a
>>> separation of duties in oversight.  The new organization seems to
>>> rely on self-interested parties having an alignment of interest
>>> with the public good as opposed to the more traditional concept
>>> of separation of duties/interest in oversight.  Am I missing the
>>> checks and balances?
>>>
>>> Best-
>>>
>>> Joe WOn 3/3/2014 9:43 PM, Milton L Mueller wrote: Nii, thanks for
>>> your questions. Most of them are actually answered in the paper
>>> itself, but I will answer your questions directly.
>>>
>>>> Why is removing USG not mean just that? End of contract
>>>
>>> First, it would be the end of 2 contracts, not one. ICANN and
>>> Verisign. You cannot just end the IANA functions contract.
>>>
>>> Second, both contracts contain serious accountability measures.
>>> However wrongly conceived the idea of unilateral U.S. oversight
>>> is, how do we ensure that the root zone is managed properly and
>>> what is the recourse if the root zone managers are either
>>> negligent, incompetent or corrupt? What do you replace the IANA
>>> contract with?
>>>
>>> The reason for a DNSA is that registries have the strongest
>>> incentive to get root zone management right. It is their data
>>> that the root zone contains. To ensure impartial administration
>>> we create a nondiscriminatory right to own DNSA to all
>>> registries?
>>>
>>>> What problem is being solved by combining functions from other
>>>> organizations to create another entity dnsa?
>>>
>>> As noted above: 1) accountability problem; 2) incentives problem.
>>> To which we can add: not letting ICANN get too powerful.
>>>
>>>> The proposed Dnsa is potentially a consortium of 1000+
>>>> registries and how would this work.
>>>
>>> Not that many companies involved. More like a few hundred; lots
>>> of companies have multiple TLDs. Ownership shares might be based
>>> on some metric of size, such as names under registration, etc.
>>>
>>> How does GNSO work? How does ccNSO work? How did Intelsat work?
>>> (consortium of ~200 national telecom operators). How did Nominet
>>> work? (shared ownership by many registrars) How does IEEE work?
>>> (hundreds of thousands of members).
>>>
>>>> Is this different from creating another ICANN
>>>
>>> Very different. ICANN is for making policy. It involves
>>> representation of diverse stakeholders and a complicated process
>>> for developing consensus on policy and approval by the board.
>>> DNSA is for operations. Most people I have talked to agree that
>>> we need to keep those things separate. So, we separate them
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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