[discuss] Roadmap for globalizing IANA
jeanette at wzb.eu
Fri Mar 7 09:18:58 UTC 2014
Am 05.03.14 18:56, schrieb Milton L Mueller:
> -----Original Message----- From: Jeanette Hofmann
> [mailto:jeanette at wzb.eu]
>> Regarding 4, your model seems so expansive and expensive that I
>> find it hard to imagine that Verisign's bill would exceed its cost
>> in the long run.
> No, this is a charge with no factual basis.
None of us has a factual basis. We are speculating about future
developments. I therefore wrote "seem".
The DNSA creates an
> operational process and pays someone to do it. While it may be
> expensive to create the DNSA, the actual root zone operations would
> be no more expensive than now, possibly less in the long term because
> less arbitrarily divided and no NTIA "man in the middle" - and the
> registries have an incentive to do it as efficiently as possible if
> they are paying for it.
>> Regarding 1 and 2, if the IANA function is indeed stripped off all
>> policy discretion, shouldn't it be possible to devise a contract
>> that makes it more or less irrelevant if the contracting partner is
>> a huge DNSA apparatus or just one organization?
> An interesting suggestion. (Note that it pushes in the exact opposite
> direction of most of the other comments we are getting, about the
> alleged power of this DNSA and the need for even more 'stakeholders'.
> I like that)
> It depends on who is contracting with whom. When you make this
> suggestion, are you suggesting that ICANN is the principal and DNSA
> the agent? Can't answer your question until you answer that one.
Yes, I guess I had ICANN as the other contractor in mind. The focus of
my question was about the simple, well defined task of the DNSA,
however. Could this task be covered by a contract that would make the
contracting partner irrelevant?
> The virtue of the DNSA is that it would have buy-in from all the
> world's registries. The object here is globalization, remember?
I get that but I wonder whether you are building a sledgehammer to crack
something that would just be a nut if properly designed.
> are correct, however, that there would be a price in complexity of
> organization. The other virtue is that 'collective bargaining with
> ICANN' element, which I see you ignored in your response.
>> One could combine the contract-based model with a supervisory board
>> that ensures compliance and takes care of complaints.
> Aha. And how is this "supervisory board" different from the
> registry-based governance structure we propose?
It would be small and not create a body that integreates all registries.
I suspect that it is
> not different at all, just not as well thought out
I am not suggesting a less thought out model, I am asking quesions about
yours to better understand the requirements of the institutional
architecture we are trying to build.
> supervisors would not have as good an incentive structure
> Keep in mind that root zone entries with DNSSEC are auditable and
> harder to manipulate.
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