[discuss] surveillance governance, was Re: [governance] NTIA statement

Sat Mar 22 08:58:31 UTC 2014

I would very much agree with Greg that Parminder's scenario of a single entity (or even a single stakeholder group, or organised cabal across a wide range of stakeholders) taking control of the ICANN board is extremely farfetched, a matter for conspiracy theory novels not a genuine worry. It is a scenario that does not plausibly survive even a casual examination of how board members are selected. 

There is only one likely scenario of all ICANN board members having their decision influenced by the same entity - and that entity is ICANN itself. While an oversight mechanism should function in such a way as to guard against a board that was all somehow controlled by a commercial entity willing to patiently infiltrate and suborn a range of ICANN processes, it should be focussed on the more likely issue that ICANN board will take decisions that are in the interests of ICANN itself, rather than the community it serves. 

David

On 19 Mar 2014, at 3:34 am, Shatan, Gregory S. <GShatan at ReedSmith.com> wrote:

>> snip
>> Today, if a focused commercial entity decided to slowly but patiently
>> seek to gain effective control of the ICANN Board (or if the ICANN
>> Board itself decide over time consolidate its hold for purpose of
>> personal gain), I believe that the present NTIA contract would provide
>> an effective option for putting things back on track (whether via the
>> threat of non-renewal or via an actual rebidding process)
>> snip
> 
> I honestly think this is a really far-fetched scenario.  You should look at how ICANN board members become board members (and stay board members).  Board members are nominated by quite a number of different methods: 8 by the NomCom (cited by Mike Roberts, which itself has members from disparate groups in the ICANN ecosystem and goes through a significant process to find and select potential Board members), 2 from the GNSO, 2 from ccNSO, 1 from ALAC, 2 from ASO.  Nonvoting liaisons from SSAC, RSSAC, and IETF also participate, including on committees. The organizations that nominate these board members look to them to represent their interests on the board.  If we feel like someone is not acting as an appropriate representative, they won't stay on the Board.
> 
> I suppose if John Grisham or Dan Brown decided to turn their imaginations to a scenario such as you imagine, they might be able to come up with something interesting, but the thousands of people you would have to fool and hoodwink boggles my lesser imagination.  The idea of the Board consolidating its hold for personal gain is even more far-fetched.  Of course, this is not a utopian ideal made real, either, and there are all kinds of criticisms that can and have been made regarding every aspect of the ICANN Board (and every other aspect of ICANN as well).  Depending on who you ask, the ICANN Board bends over backwards for Registries and/or Registrars, doesn't do nearly enough to safeguard the interests of Registries and/or Registrars; the ICANN Board bends over backwards for business and/or IP interests, doesn't do nearly enough to safeguard the interests of business and/or IP interests; the ICANN Board bends over backwards for civil society, doesn't do nearly enough to safeguard the interests of civil society, etc., etc.  I suppose that if everyone's a little pissed, things are working, more or less.
> 
> I suppose it's possible that hundreds of people are wasting thousands of hours of their lives, often for no compensation (this is not my "day job," and if I thought about "return on investment" I would stop typing right now), as dupes in an elaborate charade.  Based on the percentage of people who believe it, I suppose it's also possible that man walked beside dinosaurs.  As one of those potential "dupes," I'm not buying it.  And as much as my fellow ICANN participants (including those participating here) and I might be in healthy disagreement on matters of policy, process, outcome, etc., I don't think they would disagree with me on this either.  If this type of immense, sustained "con" were true, it would make Jonestown look like a corner lemonade stand.
> 
> Far-fetched or not, I don't think we need NTIA oversight to protect us from these or other "horribles" proposed on this list.  I think it was nice to have while it was around, but we'll do fine without it.
> 
> As a final note to all on this list, the 2014 NomCom process is accepting nominations until April 1.  Feel free to nominate yourself or someone else to a board seat.  https://www.icann.org/en/groups/nomcom/2014.
> 
> Greg Shatan
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: discuss-bounces at 1net.org [mailto:discuss-bounces at 1net.org] On Behalf Of Mike Roberts
> Sent: Tuesday, March 18, 2014 2:12 PM
> To: John Curran
> Cc: discuss at 1net.org
> Subject: Re: [discuss] surveillance governance, was Re: [governance] NTIA statement
> 
> John -
> 
> I apologize to anyone on this list who thinks I was lumping them in a paranoid fringe.  I was referring to extreme statements from other sources.
> 
> - Mike
> 
> 
> On Mar 18, 2014, at 10:54 AM, John Curran <jcurran at istaff.org> wrote:
> 
>> On Mar 18, 2014, at 6:04 PM, Mike Roberts <mmr at darwin.ptvy.ca.us> wrote:
>>> ...
>>> But what about the existing NTIA role, you might ask.  In fact, as others have said, it is an empty role that was never envisaged as part of ICANN.  It is not mentioned in the 1998 NTIA White Paper, which contained the policy guidance for creating ICANN.
>> 
>> Mike -
>> 
>> Your are correct - the White Paper specified that the organization
>> derive its legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders,
>> which would be membership organizations in the areas of numbers, names and protocols, as well as the direct interests of Internet users.
>> 
>> It's likely that such a Board structure (and ICANN organization whose
>> primary focus was on the coordination and oversight across that system
>> rather than DNS policy development) would be just fine and not require
>> much discussion of external oversight mechanisms...  However, the
>> organization described in the White Paper does not really resemble
>> today's ICANN in the least, given that both DNS policy development is actually done within ICANN (in addition to the DNS policy implementation) rather than in a separate DNS membership body.
>> 
>>> But what about collusion or malfeasance on the Board, you might ask.  The process of selecting a majority of the voting members of the Board members has received much attention over the years, and is carefully constructed and controlled by a group of volunteers from the community separately from the Board.  It has been reviewed repeatedly.  If there is a robust and more equitable method out there, propose it.
>>> 
>>> Finally, what about that old bugaboo, “capture” of ICANN and the root.  In the early years, perhaps, emphasize perhaps, that had some reality.  Today, we have a large, informed, engaged, and activist audience for ICANN policy making.  We are in the process of making that audience larger and of finding some way short of crude power politics to enfranchise new stakeholders.  Only the paranoid fringe can find traction for capture now.
>> 
>> Today, if a focused commercial entity decided to slowly but patiently
>> seek to gain effective control of the ICANN Board (or if the ICANN
>> Board itself decide over time consolidate its hold for purpose of
>> personal gain), I believe that the present NTIA contract would provide
>> an effective option for putting things back on track (whether via the
>> threat of non-renewal or via an actual rebidding process)
>> 
>> I actually have enormous faith in ICANN, both its Board and its
>> processes, but do think that it's a reasonable question for the
>> community to ask whether ICANN is structurally ready today to receive
>> permanent and irrevocable authority for the Internet identifier system, as in many ways this is effectively what occurs by default upon NTIA ceding the IANA function contract.
>> 
>> I am neither paranoid nor fringe, and would ask that you refrain from
>> judging those in the community simply because they are asking questions about what are appropriate mechanism
>> for governance of the Internet identifier system.   As a fundamental principle, we encourage
>> open and transparent discussion of such matters (even when the answers
>> are perfectly obvious to those, such as yourself, who have far more
>> experience.)
>> 
>> Thanks,
>> /John
>> 
>> Disclaimers: My views alone.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
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