[discuss] Testing "structural separation" accountability mechanism

Milton L Mueller mueller at syr.edu
Mon Sep 8 15:42:37 UTC 2014

> -----Original Message-----
> Yes, of course.  But there are two possibilities:
> 1.  ICANN in its policy-development role (let's set aside the IANA portion,
> which mostly works) behaves responsibly.
> 2.  ICANN in its policy-development role does not behave responsibly.
> If we think (1) is true, then it seems to me we need an explanation of why
> people are so discontented with the actual state of affairs.
> If we think (2) is true, then it seems to me we need an explanation of what
> the oversight that's supposed to be in place is giving us.

I am impressed by the attempt to explore the logic, but amused by the way in which this attempt completely avoids developing any logical or empirical support for retaining the IANA in ICANN. Nice diversionary tactic, that. 

So before I wade into your attempt to set a logical trap (and I will do that, later, after you respond)  you explain to me how and why an organization (ICANN) that has been operating two critical global functions (both DNS policy and IANA) with an imperfect form of oversight, that has left many people unsatisfed, should suddenly be given those functions with _no_ external oversight or no ability to lose the critical contract.

Can you explain to me in logical terms how this new structure will be:
  a) likely to result in better performance? 
  b) likely to result in greater legitimacy and support for ICANN decisions?

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