<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=iso-8859-1"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">On Feb 27, 2014, at 1:34 AM, Alejandro Pisanty <<a href="mailto:apisanty@gmail.com">apisanty@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br><div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1"><div dir="ltr">John,<div><br></div><div>thanks. That seems to be a Board which also finds itself occasionally in controversy about its actions, in particular whether it complies with policy and strictly limits itself to its prescribed role: <a href="http://lists.arin.net/pipermail/arin-ppml/2014-January/027601.html">http://lists.arin.net/pipermail/arin-ppml/2014-January/027601.html</a></div>
</div></blockquote><br></div><div>Alejandro - </div><div> </div><div> You apparently have missed the point - it is not possible to prevent controversy in</div><div> these institutions, but is it possible to lay out clear expectations regarding normal</div><div> roles in the policy development processes, and thus make for better interactions</div><div> among the various bodies during policy development. </div><div> </div><div> The example you point out above is actually ideal; it highlights that the Board does</div><div> have to ultimately take responsibility for the mission of the organization, and that</div><div> may indeed mean taking action in a "top-down" rather than "bottom-up" manner,</div><div> but such events should be quite rare and happen for understandable reasons.</div><div><br></div><div> In the particular case above, the member-elected ARIN Board used a specific</div><div> process in ARIN's policy process to temporarily suspend policy that was shown </div><div> to be serious risk to the mission and referred the matter to the community to </div><div> consider a permanent solution (the suspension was necessary before public</div><div> consideration because raising the matter with the community without first doing </div><div> so would have highlighted the loophole and resulted in severe risk.) The ARIN</div><div> Board constrained its actions by following the documented process for such a </div><div> suspension and referral, while in theory it could have just resolved the issue </div><div> issue itself. Again, the point is not whether the Board has ultimate authority</div><div> or not, but whether it is willing to constrain its use of authority along processes</div><div> which provide maximal opportunity for community consideration and feedback.</div><div><br></div><div><blockquote type="cite">Next issue please...</blockquote><br></div><div> Sure - note also that in the case above, the ARIN Board is an _elected_ body </div><div> wherein each trustee is subject to potential removal by the community, thus providing </div><div> for clear accountability for actions. In addition to providing for a clear process and </div><div> criteria for ICANN Board ratification of policy, it might be very helpful towards </div><div> accountability if the ICANN Board were similarly elected by a defined community</div><div> and subject to removal by vote. The present ICANN Bylaws make individual</div><div> directors removable only by the other ICANN directors, which doesn't exactly </div><div> provide for any counterbalance if the ICANN Board should act in a manner which</div><div> surprises the community that it supposed to be serving.</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks!</div><div>/John</div><div><br></div><div>Disclaimer: My views alone.</div><div><br></div></body></html>