<html><head></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space; ">Milton,<div>Amongst some otherwise very good points, this one misses the mark<div>The issue is not removing IANA from ICANN</div><div>Its about removing IANA from the USG.</div><div><br></div><div>A separated IANA that is (still) contracted to USG hasn't solved the big issue.</div><div><br></div><div>Second, as a matter of practical politics, it will take a New Entity 15 years to engender sufficient trust in its independence, soundness, immunity, freedom from capture etc etc.</div><div>That includes at NTIA - which is not going to hand over to a new, untrusted, untested body, with a new board, new staff, new processes...</div><div><br></div><div>Better to first transfer IANA responsibility out of USG to ICANN, which is purpose built for the job, already houses the entity physically, and has now ( I submit) established itself as the worthy body to house its responsibility.</div><div><br></div><div>That also completes the White Paper Plan - people like to see closure. Everyone can declare victory at that point.</div><div><br></div><div>Once IANA is untethered but inside ICANN, with full <i><b>functional</b></i> separation from the policy making process, and away from the USG, you begin Stage 2 - which is to your endgame of a <b><i>structurally</i></b> separated IANA. Along the way, you work on developing consensus answers to all the accountability/protection/funding/immunity questions you're now getting.</div><div><br></div><div>With luck, it will be a 3-5 year project. Count on my help.</div><div><br></div><div>regards</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>Peter</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div> <br><div><div>On 6/03/2014, at 5:42 AM, Milton L Mueller wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><div><br><br>-----Original Message-----<br><blockquote type="cite">Roland Perry:<br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">But only because ICANN won the contract (each time so far). It should <br></blockquote><blockquote type="cite">not be taken for granted that they always will.<br></blockquote><br>Actually, it pretty much can be taken for granted. If someone took the IANA functions contract away from ICANN, one would have two choices: <br><br>1. ICANN's entire policy making apparatus becomes obsolete, and a new organization with an entirely new policy making process comes into existence, generating months or maybe years of uncertainty and political maneuvering, or <br><br>2. The new IANA functions contractor must develop a contract between itself and ICANN, in which it promises to implement ICANN's policy decisions. (Does that sound familiar?)<br><br>Option 1 is a disaster that no one wants. Option 2 is one step along the 3-step path outlined by the IGP proposal. Unless one is willing to really separate the IANA functions from ICANN's policy process, ICANN always knows it will get the contract eventually, although it may have to adjust its promises to the Dept of Commerce.<br><br>Option 2 is similar to what IGP is proposing, except we also free the IANA functions from unilateral implementation by Verisign. <br><br>My point here is that if you REALLY want to use the IANA functions to make ICANN accountable, you must do exactly what IGP is proposing, namely remove the IANA functions from ICANN. As long as those functions are internalized in ICANN, the award of the contract is an imperfect accountability mechanism at best. ICANN will always control the contract by default, unless the principal is willing to massively disrupt the domain name system. <br><br><br><br>_______________________________________________<br>discuss mailing list<br><a href="mailto:discuss@1net.org">discuss@1net.org</a><br>http://1net-mail.1net.org/mailman/listinfo/discuss<br></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></body></html>