<div dir="ltr">On 4 September 2014 12:14, John Curran <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jcurran@istaff.org" target="_blank">jcurran@istaff.org</a>></span> wrote:<br><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div class="">On Sep 4, 2014, at 11:53 AM, Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>> wrote:</div><div><div class=""><blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">John,<div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On 4 September 2014 11:47, John Curran <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:jcurran@istaff.org" target="_blank">jcurran@istaff.org</a>></span> wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div>On Sep 4, 2014, at 11:15 AM, Jordan Carter <<a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a>> wrote:<br>
<br>
> But: isn't the main debate the fact that there is a policy/operations separation for protocols and numbers, but not names?<br>
><br>
> And that the simplest, most elegant way to achieve that for names is to put the IANA functions operator in a new box?<br>
<br>
</div>Given that the IANA has been performing its tasks correctly, moving it will not<br>
meaningfully change the present situation or outcomes.<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>It changes the accountability environment for names, with no difference for the other customers. Nobody wants to change the present operational situation per se.</div>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div>It does, but only if you presume that each of the served communities has a clear</div><div>voice and can meaningfully contract for its portion of the IANA services. �Is this</div>
<div>your understanding as well?</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Well, I rather thought that ICANN itself might be able to do that for names. But I know that might be a rather heroic assumption for a range of reasons.</div>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div class=""><br><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra">
<div class="gmail_quote"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<br>
On the other hand, if the problem is that the DNS community does not have an<br>
independent voice with which to engage ICANN as a partner (rather than only<br>
having internal accountability mechanisms as deigned by the Board), that is a<br>
different situation and likely require something other than just moving the IANA<br>
to address.<br>
<div><br>
> (compared with gTLDs and ccTLDs having to form non-ICANN policy bodies... a nightmare if ever there was one)<br><br>
</div>See above.<br>
<br></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Do you genuinely think it is easier to move the set of names stakeholders than it is to move the IANA functions operator, given their relative scale, diversity, operational consequences, etc?</div>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div>Unless the names stakeholders have organized to the extent of being able to enter�</div><div>into an agreement for IANA services, I am uncertain how moving the IANA provides�</div>
<div>any additional accountability.</div><div><div class=""><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">
</div></div></div></blockquote><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div><br></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>Because it separates the ICANN Board from having two roles: of accepting / making names policy, and governing the IANA functions operator.</div>
<div>�</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div class=""><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote">
<div></div></div></div></div><blockquote type="cite"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_extra"><div class="gmail_quote"><div>I'd be interested in you teasing this out.</div><div><br></div><div>I'd also like to point out that there are many forms of "moving". An easy one is a management board for the IANA department that has to validate changes as in line with policy etc, but leaving it within ICANN legally and practically (finance, HR etc). �A slightly bigger departure is as a wholly owned subsidiary company of ICANN with an operating agreement. The most radical approach as outlined by Milton months ago is more complicated, but would also work.</div>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div></div><div>In all of those cases, IANA would have made the same IANA registry changes (e.g.</div><div>to the DNS root zone) as it did over the past decade, correct? � If that's not the case,�</div>
<div>I'd like to understand what it would have done differently and how the proposed�</div><div>"changed accountability environment for names" �would have produced a different</div><div>outcome.</div><div><br>
</div></div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>We aren't talking about the past, we are talking about the future in the absence of the real or imagined restraint of the NTIA Contract being in place, and all the implications of that on how ICANN behaves or might behave, now or in the short or medium term.</div>
<div>�</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div></div><div>I think you'll find that IANA has been following directions accurately, but there's quite a</div>
<div>bit of "DNS policy implementation" which takes place within ICANN and that sometimes</div><div>heads in unexpected directions. �If this is the case, focusing on IANA accountability is</div><div>missing the root cause of the angst that is being experienced, yes?</div>
</div></div></blockquote><div><br></div><div>I think the root cause of the angst is ICANN's culture, and its failure to conceive of its role as primarily serving the community.</div><div><br></div><div>That cultural failure leads to the sorts of staff and Board decisions that have eroded trust between ICANN-the-organisation and the ICANN community.</div>
<div><br></div><div>That leads to process and accountability pushes, because those who are not internal to ICANN-the-organisation appear to be unable to shape its culture.</div><div><br></div><div>Thus part of the desire to separate ICANN-the-organisation from IANA-the-operator. Relates too to Andrew Sullivan's post of yesterday and the discussion there, where we need to blend structures for accountability with trust in the people inhabiting them.</div>
<div><br></div><div>As an aside - it would have been a lot easier to deal with all this if the stewardship-transition-related accountability debate was integrated with the stewardship-transition debate.</div><div><br></div>
<div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Jordan</div><div>�</div><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div style="word-wrap:break-word"><div><div><br></div><div>
Thanks!</div><div class=""><div>/John</div><div><br></div><div>Disclaimer: my views alone.</div><div><br></div></div></div></div></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div dir="ltr">Jordan Carter<br>
<br>Chief Executive <br><b>InternetNZ</b><br><br>04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)<br><a href="mailto:jordan@internetnz.net.nz" target="_blank">jordan@internetnz.net.nz</a> <br>Skype: jordancarter<br><br><i>To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential.</i><br>
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