<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html charset=us-ascii"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; -webkit-line-break: after-white-space;">On Sep 5, 2014, at 9:47 AM, Milton L Mueller <<a href="mailto:mueller@syr.edu">mueller@syr.edu</a>> wrote:<br><div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><blockquote type="cite"><span style="color: rgb(31, 73, 125); font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; font-style: normal; font-variant: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; line-height: normal; orphans: auto; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: auto; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; display: inline !important; float: none;">The ultimate form of accountability is when the IANA functions can be taken away from the provider. That is, the contract can be awarded to someone else if ICANN performs poorly, takes ultra vires actions, etc.</span></blockquote></div><br><div>Milton - </div><div> </div><div> Let's test the usefulness of this mechanism... If this had been the case, then when over </div><div> the last decade would have the community moved the IANA functions from ICANN, and</div><div> how would that decision have been made?</div><div><br></div><div> I understand how other mechanisms (e.g. ability to remove a Board member) can be used</div><div> readily used as an accountability mechanism (and don't require major operation changes),</div><div> but if the policy communities had had control of the "structural separation" knob rather than</div><div> NTIA, when and how would it have been used?</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks!</div><div>/John</div><div><br></div><div>Disclaimer: my views alone</div><div><br></div></body></html>