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John,<br><br>
We have just discussed your message in a MYCANN Skype meeting. It seems
that we have framework agreement with you, however with a simple and
clearly identified disagreement concerning our different perspectives.
This should help in clearly identifying the issues at stake.<br><br>
1. The MYCANN team and its first tentative users (still at this stage
quite intermixed with the MYCANN reflection small group) want to
emphasize that in its opinion the situation is not black and white.
<br><br>
We are in an NTIACANN radically monopolistic (cf. Ivan Illich) situation
that is to slowly evolve due to the respective power and strategies of
the different internet global communities documented, but not identified,
by IAB, IEEE, IETF, ISOC, W3C, RIRs, and ICANN as benefiting humanity
(RFC 6852). <br><br>
In the resulting semi-fragmented internet situation, MYCANN is only an
initiative to help the emergence of a Libre IUser global community, aside
from the Apple, Google, ICANN, Microsoft, etc. global communities. Most
of them are rooted in the users operating systems, ICANN and IUsers are
in the network interoperating approaches.<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">At 00:09 10/09/2014, John Curran
wrote:<br>
In the situation where IANA is a contracted service, i.e. where the
"parties with policy <br>
development authority for particular registries" contract with an
"IANA operator" to <br>
maintain the those registries according to the supplied policy, then the
IANA operator's<br>
performance should be both easy to predict and manage (or the contractor
would very <br>
likely be dropped in short order for one that performed per community
policy.)<b></b></blockquote><br>
Yes. <br><br>
The MYCANN project addresses that hypothesis not only as a possibility
but as a current demand of our Libre community, in addition to the
preoccupation for a "fail safe plan for the net" initiated by
JFC Morfin. This demand was confirmed and better discussed during the
RMLL Montpellier meeting in July of this year. <br><br>
It might boil down to their current thinking of the IANA becoming a
protocol of information for the MDRS (metadata registry system) that
should be the core of Libre's accomplishment of the IEN 48 second
objective. (JFC Morfin adds the need of what he calls the M&M model,
i.e. a technological universal version of multistakeholderism).<br><br>
In their perspective, every existing and additional source of IANA
information (including ISO, Unicode, ITU, DNS Ledgers [such as ICANN],
etc.) are MDRS co-maintainers co/operated/assisted by end-user selected
distributed value-added digital providers.<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">This raises a separate but
interconnected question about how the relevant communities of
interest<b></b></blockquote><br>
The MYCANN initiative's understanding is that there will be a slow back
and forth move between the communities of commercial and personal
interest (as is for every market). (E.g. those who are affected by the
DNS root zone). This move will allow IUsers to test and decide the
network perspective they want to adopt.<br><br>
MYCANN does not perceive any market monopoly transferred from old NetSol
to ICANN in that area, but rather continuity with the namespace initial
design and RFCs. This is because it adheres to ICANN ICP-3 and
acknowledges the quasi unlimited number of individual root files that the
DNS software is designed for. Something that MUST, however (cf. ICP-3),
be better documented, tested, and validated and deployed in a community
and not in a commercially oriented spirit. Moreover, the current
commercially motivated status quo/US jurisdiction strategy is going to
upset States and lead to State protective reactions.<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""> those affected by the IETF
protocol parameter registries, <b></blockquote><br>
</b>MYCANN addresses a situation where the IETF end to end parameters are
encapsulated together with fringe to fringe multitechnology parameters,
formats, protocols, etc. <br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">those affected by IP number
resource management)<b></b></blockquote><br>
It is likely that IP addresses...<br><br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">agree to exercise their inherent
authority via a particular organization, for example, the Internet
protocol development community via the IETF, the service provider and IP
address using community via the RIRs, and the DNS community via
ICANN. <b></b></blockquote><br>
and many other things should evolve toward a human/legally moderated
neutral algorithmic form of governance. <br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite=""> am not really concerned
about that question with respect to the IETF, as the technical protocol
parameter identifier are generally not assigned to real-world things
likes organizations, countries, or people, </blockquote><br>
Correct. <br><br>
For the time being. Subsidiarity leads to a situation where these
parameters will results in tables and formats that will be currently used
by countries, languages, organizations, and people as describing the
substance of their VGN (what MYCANN expect to be the
"netlocales" extension of the "locale" file that it
is to be prepared to adapt to).<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">whereas ensuring the bodies that
have policy development authority for Internet names <br>
and numbers provide bona fide representation for their communities would
seem to be <br>
essential for moving forward.<b></b></blockquote><br>
The MYCANN assumption is that this can only happen by subsidiarity, i.e.
that the concerned bodies� granularity is to adapt to the bona fide
representation requirements and not the people to any globally unilateral
conception.<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">It would appear that to the
extent that ICANN (and the RIRs) have excellent structures for governance
and accountability, then they'll perform in accordance with interests of
their affected communities, and IANA accountability could be routine
contracting.</blockquote> <br>
It appears that this supposed extent is what they call the BUG (being
unilaterally global) that leads to a BUG (business unilateral governance)
that they do not want.<br><br>
<br>
<blockquote type=cite class=cite cite="">Trying to make IANA
accountability structures that address the IANA operator's failure to
perform is quite straightforward; it is when we also try to address the
possible situation of the IANA operator performing exactly as directed
(but somehow out of alignment with served community) that designing
mechanisms for accountability becomes rather
challenging..<b></b></blockquote><br>
That mechanism is a "mutually recognized concurrent
competition" of which the regulation is concerted via a
multistakeholder process. MYCANN has the ambition to assist this in
providing new entrants with the Libre tools adapted to their RFC 6852
markets that will not destabilize the services provided by the incumbents
(cf. ICP-3)<br><br>
There is an observed contention that results from the incumbents' lack of
adequate consideration of the new entrants� specificities: it is named
the status quo and it negatively impacts RFC 6852. This is what JFC
Morfin started enlightening through his appeals against that RFC: the
algorithmic governance that it establishes is only based upon aggregated
economic constraints instead of being people centered (as per the WSIS
consensus).<br><br>
<a name="_GoBack"></a>The NTIA has also identified this. It has adopted a
parallel approach that aims at a different and deliberate target:
retaining market hegemony in completing/replacing the economic
constraints by a ubiquitous US leadership through jurisdiction.<br><br>
MYCANN is the support of a "weak to strong" mechanism that can
balance the US attempt to perpetuate its 1980s BUG by a BUG. Actually,
this should lead to a weak, centralized global ICANN that is complemented
by many strong subsidiary local ICANNs. <br><br>
<br>
FSP4.NET/MYCANN - Multi-Stakeholder Group<br>
JFC Morfin as a spoke person.</body>
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