[discuss] Current drive
jefsey at jefsey.com
Fri Apr 4 14:11:10 UTC 2014
1. I agree that Milton's approach (not the solution) is the only one
we can currently work on since George said he is to revamp his position.
2. from your questions, you want to see real actions to be
tested/discussed rather than putative thoughts to be "blah blah blah"ed.
These two points seem to be enough in order to address the issue in
the way the NTIA wishes it.
1. there are three possibilities because in real life you do not
change things, you build aside things, so:
1.0. either the internet is closed and something else is to replace it.
1.1. either the current system is continued; this is George's line as
far as I understand it.
1.2. or a new system is built and tested in parallel.
- This is where Milton's line should lead us if he was
not actually trying to reform the current system with new ideas.
- This is what I have triggered and reported, based upon
Milton's initial logic.
2. If you consider only the 1.1. and 1.2. options, there are only two
possible known stable systems: top-down or bottom-up. A hybrid
proposition cannot be expected to build-up easily and auto-maintain
stably. The current system is top-down due to the claimed legitimacy
from building the internet is from the leading world power. The NTIA
removal has only two possible results:
2.1. either it reinforces the leading power's influence on stability
in bringing the stability of the leading power's law as a referent
instead of its political executive. This is the NTIA MSist
hypothesis. It calls for an adaptation of the US law (by Congress)
before the 9/9/19 date, as assigned by the NTIA (cf. L. Strickling),
if we allow three weeks for a pre-crash emergency agreement.
2.2. or it switches to the other stable system: bottom-up and proves
that it has fully assumed the transition before 9/9/19.
This means that it is ICANN vs. DNSA.
In order to clarify the debate, I suggest that
- the "discuss" and "IANAtransition" keep discussing the 2.1.
George/Milton solution (i.e. ICANN plus possible DNSA),
- and "agora" is the list to debate the 2.2. solution at
(i.e. DNSA including ICANN as a leading stakeholder).
Both solutions obviously share the same "MSism" intent that in
European English is called "concertation".
- In the 2.1. approach, the stakeholders (or partners) are chosen by
the top and have to be clearly defined by the law for the system to
be resilient. The need is to determine the law and to get it
implemented and accepted.
- in the 2.2. approach, the partners (or stakeholders) are the
multitude, i.e. everyone who "wishes to be" a participant, like at
the IETF and Wikipedia. There is no leadership, but a steering
secretariat can be forked at any time, making it accountable to the
network itself. By the multitude for the multitude: the DNSes' Wikipedia.
The origin of the whole issue is, therefore, that our known
governance systems do not scale to the globally "catenet"ed human
society. We have to invent one that will be adapted to the new scale
of the computer assisted human gathering and decision processes,
beginning with the governance of that very system.
- There are those who want to enhance the existing governance to make
it more "democratic".
- There are those who want to carefully (ICANN/ICP-3 gives good
guidelines) test (a) new system(s), so that evidence will show on
9/9/19which is the one to retain (or if they can cooperate). This is
what the NTIA is calling for.
This does not prevent those who think that the proper global
granularity is neither with the doers nor with the users but with the
rulers to pursue an ITU based proposition. IMHO, but this is only on
my opinion, the three systems apply, each at its own stratum in the
network pile. This is why they do not oppose but complete. We have
5.5 years to observe, learn, and agree how.
This being said, I triggered the DNSA for it to belong to everyone
and its own technical target is to be its own "named data system", so
that the leadership issue is fully diluted in our polycratic
This is algorithmic governance, it should therefore be
algorithmically governed by public protocol.
At 07:53 04/04/2014, Alejandro Pisanty wrote:
>at this point an asymmetric approach to the problem may be
>productive (addressing Michael Gurstein and Parminder Jeet Singh as well):
>Very briefly: Frank LaRue, the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
>Expression, has proposed for years that instead of defining
>"Internet rights" positively, in detail, etc. we focus on the rights
>themselves and prevent, prosecute and punish their violations
>independently of whether "online" is involved or not (disclaimer:
>very briefly, my own summary for this discussion.)
>In the same mode of thinking the questions about public interest can
>be recast. What specifically goes against the public interest, and
>how vital is it to solve it? (solving one problem has the cost of
>opportunity of not solving others.) A framework similar to risk
>management (identifying separately probability and impact; assessing
>the risk/damage-cost-benefit relations) may be useful.
>This approach may quickly lead us to productive steps on the problem
>Milton continues to discuss and the one now posed by George. The
>other approach seems to me to have been wrung drier than by lyophilization.
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