[discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is globalized? (:-)

Alejandro Pisanty apisanty at gmail.com
Thu Mar 13 13:51:14 UTC 2014


Michael,

no.

Alejandro Pisanty


On Thu, Mar 13, 2014 at 2:47 AM, michael gurstein <gurstein at gmail.com>wrote:

> Interesting response Greg (and Alejandro...
>
>
>
> Are you both saying that MSism as currently being presented for Internet
> Governance will be a part of ICANN and thus operate within the rules and
> practices of ICANN?
>
>
>
> And is this something that the various other proponents of MSism have
> agreed to?
>
>
>
> If this is the case then I believe that it changes everything in that
> ICANN now becomes the global Internet Governance framework.
>
>
>
> M
>
>
>
> *From:* Shatan, Gregory S. [mailto:GShatan at ReedSmith.com]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 12, 2014 11:58 AM
> *To:* 'michael gurstein'; 'George Sadowsky'
> *Cc:* 'Naresh Ajwani'; discuss at 1net.org
> *Subject:* RE: [discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is
> globalized? (:-)
>
>
>
> Michael:
>
>
>
> I'll answer this in more length later, but I wanted to point out right
> away that multistakeholderism in the ICANN GNSO relates almost entirely to
> developing policy recommendations related to gTLDs.  That is what the
> "Generic Names Supporting Organization" is mandated to do.  I don't think
> of these as "engineering based approaches" at all.
>
>
>
> And this is no "pig in a poke":  there is plenty of available information
> on the multistakeholder system in effect at the GNSO.  For general
> information, you might look at:
>
>
>
> http://gnso.icann.org/en/basics/consensus-policy/pdp
>
> http://gnso.icann.org/en/council/procedures
>
> http://content.netmundial.br/docs/contribs/page:9 (#177 submitted by a
> cross-community ICANN working group)
>
>
>
> More particularly, the working group system is open and transparent - each
> WG has a wiki, where you can find recordings, transcripts, working
> documents etc.  Working Group reports are published for public comment by
> anyone in the world - look at some reports and some public comments.  If
> you would like - submit a public comment - you are now a part of the
> process.  Welcome!  If you come to an ICANN meeting (no registration fee),
> you will see MSism in action.  Can't come?  Everything is available for
> remote participation.
>
>
>
> Frankly, I'm hard pressed to think of anything that is less "in a poke"
> than the GNSO multistakeholder system.
>
>
>
> Indeed, I think that multistakeholderism ICANN is one of the great
> experiments in disintermediated governance participation by individuals and
> entities.  While it's not perfect, it's something the Internet community
> should actually be proud of, rather than viewing it through a cloud of
> FUD.  When I discovered that I could move from serving on random committees
> in other organizations that push paper into the ozone, to actually
> participating in the decision-making process at ICANN, I was first
> astounded, then delighted, then impressed, and then overworked....  But it is
> actually quite an amazing thing.
>
>
>
> Greg Shatan
>
>
>
> Greg Shatan
>
>
>
> *From:* michael gurstein [mailto:gurstein at gmail.com <gurstein at gmail.com>]
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 12, 2014 2:28 PM
> *To:* 'George Sadowsky'; Shatan, Gregory S.
> *Cc:* 'Naresh Ajwani'; discuss at 1net.org
> *Subject:* RE: [discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is
> globalized? (:-)
>
>
>
> Thanks George (and Greg...
>
>
>
> These are thoughtful responses and useful references and I have a clearer
> idea from these than I have had previously concerning what you at least are
> meaning by "multistakeholder" processes and consensus decision making.
>
>
>
> I think that an in-depth analysis and debate concerning the applicability
> of these essentially engineering based approaches to problem solving to
> larger social/political issues having to do with broad governance and
> policy matters is warranted and is in fact urgent given the rush to embed
> MSism as the preferred policy mode in the Internet Governance sphere.
>
>
>
> However, reading the responses and the documents I'm struck by several
> unresolved (and perhaps irresolvable) issues with respect to the
> transference of the IETF technical decision making processes to these other
> areas (and yes, for those who will find the following "tedious" or
> "repetitious"... these issues still remain unaddressed and in the absence of
> an effective rebuttal the proponents of MSism are asking all of us to buy
> what is essentially a "pig in a poke" concerning some of the most
> significant matters concerning governance in the 21st century.
>
> 1.       It is stressed repeatedly in the documents identified that the
> issues at hand are technical/engineering issues.  What that means for me at
> least is that they are issues where the disagreements such as they are, are
> "practical" or "technical" i.e. having to do with identifying the most
> efficient/effective results of an agreed upon course of action with the
> disagreement being concerned with these courses of action while the overall
> outcome and criteria are (taken for granted) as being non-contentious.  In
> the broader policy sphere this is not the case.  Matters of disagreement
> are generally in terms of desirable outcomes while the means of achieving
> these is relatively less contentious and seen as mere matters of
> administration or technical implementation.
>
> 2.       The initial framing of the issues to which the IETF/consensus
> approach is applied is equally taken as being non-contentious.  The issues
> are primarily technical ones with historical and technical antecedents and
> thus disputes (including the accommodation of minority/divergent positions)
> is undertaken within the context of this pre-existent framing. However, in
> the broader "policy" world, the framing of the issue--the establishment of
> the context/language/definitions in which the issue is addressed is crucial
> to the determination of the outcome including for example framing a
> discussion as a discussion about technical details of implementation rather
> than matters of fundamental principle based on clear difference of
> interest/values and so on.
>
> 3.       There is clear commitment in the documents to decisions being
> made by those who show up i.e. those who have sufficient interest in the
> outcome of the decision to make the effort to participate. However in
> many/most policy discussions some at least of those who are crucial to the
> effectiveness/legitimacy of the outcome decision may not without
> extra-ordinary effort choose or have the opportunity to participate in the
> decision--making a decision in the absence of their participation may mean
> that the ultimate decision is incapable of being usefully (or
> non-conflictually) implemented
>
> 4.       It is not clear how the public interest/public good is ensured
> as the ultimate framing for the proposed decision process based on what has
> been indicated.  The IETF process is designed to optimize for efficiency
> and effectiveness of outcomes.  In the policy world efficiency and
> effectiveness are only two among several other and necessary criteria
> including "legitimacy" (according to whatever criteria are accepted for
> legitimization in this sphere); inclusiveness i.e. ensuring that all
> necessary participants are party to the decision not simply those who are
> able or willing to "show up"; public spiritedness i.e. that participation
> in the process is guided by a desire to promote the public good rather than
> private or localized interests; transparency i.e. measures to ensure that
> the process and its participants were acting in the public interest rather
> than in support of private interests; accountability i.e. the means to
> enforce measures to ensure transparency, inclusiveness and so on.
>
> 5.       Means for responding to deep seated differences in
> values/norms/interests which go beyond disagreements as to technical
> matters of efficiency and effectiveness.  This not simply a matter of
> accommodating "minority" positions since what is a minority in one instance
> (or time period) may become a majority in another instance or time period.
> Rather it is putting into place the means for managing, accommodating and
> ultimately extending the decision framework in a way as to ensure the
> legitimation of opposing positions and means for moving forward even in the
> full recognition and acceptance of these conflicts.
>
>
>
> I'll stop here and again thank you for providing some concrete backup to
> the arguments in support of MSism but I am still waiting for you or any of
> the other proponents of MSism to address what I consider to be the
> fundamental (and in this instance "fatal") differences between technical
> decision making a la the IETF and public policy decision making as per the
> range of issues which must now or soon be addressed with respect to
> Internet Governance.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> *From:* George Sadowsky [mailto:george.sadowsky at gmail.com<george.sadowsky at gmail.com>]
>
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 12, 2014 5:24 AM
> *To:* Shatan, Gregory S.
> *Cc:* Naresh Ajwani; gurstein michael; discuss at 1net.org
> *Subject:* Re: [discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is
> globalized? (:-)
>
>
>
> It might be worth looking at Pete Resnick's excellent IETF draft on what
> rough consensus means:
>
>
>
>             https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-resnick-on-consensus-02
>
>
>
> Some of the discussion refers explicitly to the importance and treatment
> of minority opinions.  Although it is written clearly with a technical
> framework in mind, it is applicable to a broader set of considerations.
>
>
>
> George
>
>
>
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
>
>
> On Mar 12, 2014, at 2:30 AM, Shatan, Gregory S. <GShatan at ReedSmith.com>
> wrote:
>
>
>
> Naresh:
>
>
>
> Here are my thoughts on and understanding of the process.
>
>
>
> I think the "protection" of first resort for any viewpoint is the
> consensus process itself.  In a GNSO Working Group (WG), the process of
> exploration, deliberation, persuasion and negotiation is fairly deliberate
> and painstaking.  The consensus that emerges from the process is often not
> the position that any group or groups held coming into the WG, but rather a
> synthesis of views as a result of the process.  The ideal consensus result
> is full consensus, and most if not all parties in the consensus process
> need to move off their initial positions to build consensus (full or
> rough).  All the parties in the WG participate in defining the consensus,
> whether they end up signing on to it or not.  So the goal of any group is
> to move the consensus toward one's own position, while (ideally) moving
> one's own position toward the emerging consensus.  In  a sense, the best
> protection for a potential "minority view" is not to end up as a minority
> view, but rather to end up influencing the consensus so that it resembles
> that view to the extent possible, with the result that the consensus is
> thus acceptable to the group holding what might otherwise have been a
> minority view.
>
>
>
> if after the consensus process, a Consensus forms but there are still
> parties that disagree with the Consensus, they are entitled to submit a
> Minority View, which becomes part of the Preliminary Report of the Working
> Group (WG), which is put out for public comment.  Public comments would
> typically be submitted by stakeholders in the Minority View position and
>  those who agree with the Minority View (as well as comments from many
> other viewpoints).  The WG will review  and consider the comments, which
> may cause the WG to consider revising the consensus if the comments contain
> new facts or persuasive argument.  The WG then produces a final report
> which is again put up for public comment.  The comments are again reviewed
> and changes may be made at this point as well.  The final report is then
> submitted by the Working Group to the GNSO Council, which reviews the final
> report (including the minority view(s)) in considering the recommendations
> made by the WG.  The minority views might persuade the Council to reject or
> modify a recommendation.  The recommendations approved by the GNSO Council
> are passed on to the ICANN Board, which will adopt the recommendations as
> policy unless voted down by a supermajority vote.
>
>
>
> At this point, I don't think it is an issue of "ensuring the rights of
> minorities."  The group holding the minority view may not be a "minority"
> in a sense of the word other than that they supported the losing
> arguments.  Any group can hold a "minority view."  For any given
> recommendation, the minority view might be held by the business community,
> IP interests, civil society, registrars or registries (or there may be no
> minority view at all).  If a group's view is not adopted by the larger
> group as a policy recommendation after everything above, that's basically
> the end of the story in terms of policy development (though as noted above,
> the view of the larger group will likely have changed due to that party's
> participation in the process).  The next "protection" will be participating
> in implementation oversight to ensure that implementation does not depart
> from policy (at least not in a way that Is detrimental to that group's
> interests).
>
>
>
> As far as the question of "minority representation" goes, I am not
> entirely clear what you are referencing.  At the beginning of the process
> there are no minorities, in the sense of those holding views different from
> the majority - simply because no majority has really formed yet.  In a
> sense, every stakeholder group is a minority of one.  Certainly, there may
> be groups that are closer to each other in viewpoint, but they may or may
> not form any kind of majority.
>
>
>
> If what you are referring to are "minorities" in a geographic, national,
> cultural or ethnic sense, that's a whole different set of questions and
> answers, that really has little to do with the issue of holding (or
> potentially holding a "minority view" in the consensus process.  This is
> not to dismiss the issue of underrepresentation in ICANN or any other
> entity, or to be blind to the idea that underrepresented groups may have
> viewpoints that are underrepresented or not represented at all (even as
> "minority views").  Those are real issues - just not the same issue as how
> a party in a consensus process can make sure that the result of that
> process resembles their view as closely as possible.  It's also worth
> noting that similar views may be held by groups or individuals with widely
> varied geographic, national, cultural and ethnic backgrounds, whether or
> not some might be considered "minorities" in some sense of the word and
> others not.  Indeed, one of the valuable results of the consensus process
> is to discuss and commingle viewpoints among disparate actors and to arrive
> at a greater understanding or ideally a common viewpoint at the end of the
> process.
>
>
>
> Greg Shatan
>
>
>
> *From:* Naresh Ajwani [mailto:ajwaninaresh at gmail.com<ajwaninaresh at gmail.com>]
>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 11, 2014 9:57 PM
> *To:* Shatan, Gregory S.
> *Cc:* George Sadowsky; michael gurstein; discuss at 1net.org
> *Subject:* Re: [discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is
> globalized? (:-)
>
>
>
> Dear Greg,
>
> ".......So, there is no such thing as a "veto" by any particular party -
> if they are in the opposition, they are entitled to submit a Minority View,
> but they are not entitled to stop a Consensus from being formed...."
>
> Would you please let us know that how this process addresses minority
> representation?
>
> U wud appreciate that democracy is not only about majority or so explained
> consensus but ensuring the rights of minorities too.
>
> Regards & best wishes
>
> Naresh Ajwani
>
> On 11 Mar 2014 22:10, "Shatan, Gregory S." <GShatan at reedsmith.com> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
> And I'm not sure what a Mulstatkeholderist approach can contribute here.
> I don't see that a "consensus" position is either possible nor necessarily
> desirable--what kind of consensus position could a Google sign on to in the
> case I've just pointed. I for one wouldn't particularly want the range of
> options to be considered in the political/policy forum to be subject to a
> veto by Google as would presumably be required by a MSist approach with
> consensus outputs. Similarly even entering into the MSist context would to
> my mind be disempowering in an instance such as this given the depth of
> resources--human, financial, political/influential which a Google could toss
> at the issue and which would in an enforced MSist (and regrettably it seems
> in the broader political contexts as well), be effectively and practically
> overwhelming.
>
> <snip>
>
>
>
> Michael:
>
>
>
> Actually, your presumptions are incorrect.  This is not how
> multistakeholderism and consensus actually works, at least not within the
> ICANN GNSO.
>
>
>
> First, "consensus" in that context (among others) is actually what some
> others call "rough consensus."  The GNSO operates under levels of consensus
> (termed Full Consensus (unanimity), Consensus (some opposition), Strong
> Support But Significant Opposition, and Divergence (no prevailing view)).
> So, there is no such thing as a "veto" by any particular party - if they
> are in the opposition, they are entitled to submit a Minority View, but
> they are not entitled to stop a Consensus from being formed.
>
>
>
> Second, the primary level on which multistakeholder consensus-building
> takes place is the "stakeholder representative" level, not the
> self-interested individual level.  While there can certainly be
> "self-interest" involved, individuals who look out for the needs of their
> employer rather than the stakeholders they represent tend to get
> "disciplined" by the process (by other reps of the same stakeholder group,
> by the stakeholder group generally, and even by representatives of other
> stakeholder groups who are protecting the integrity of the process).
> Someone who is clearly advancing an entity position tends to get push-back.
>
>
>
> Third, the multistakeholder process tends to blunt perceived advantages
> based on purported "depth of resources."  When business, IP, ISP,
> registrar, registry, civil society, ALAC, nonprofit, etc., representatives
> get on a call or in a room, the process of stating positions, discussion,
> negotiation and attempts to develop consensus (and/or minority views) is
> really quite equal - a civil society rep from Morocco has just much of an
> opportunity to shape the discussion as an ISP rep from Virginia.  Resources
> (beyond travel budgets) really don't get you all that much in the MS
> process.  (They may get you more in working around the MS process, which is
> an argument to strengthen MSism, not to weaken it.)  Frankly, having been
> involved in ICANN for a few years, I think that there is little truth to
> the idea that private sector companies generally throw vast resources at
> ICANN matters.  Entities for which domain names and the domain name
> business are central may devote resources to ICANN matters, but for the
> private sector generally, this area gets little attention and few resources.
>
>
>
> Given the above, the multistakeholder approach is actually incredibly
> *empowering*.  As  a participant in a number of ICANN working groups,
> I've been incredibly impressed by the work ethic, intelligence, mutual
> respect, ability to air and influence views and consensus-*building *energy
> that is the hallmark of multistakeholderism done well.  The
> multistakeholder approach, in concert with transparency and accountability,
> actually acts a "check and balance" system, making it difficult for any one
> stakeholder group's positions to dominate, much less the positions of a
> single stakeholder.  I think it's the best hope for the voice of disparate
> groups to influence policy and practice.
>
>
>
> I would urge you to familiarize yourself more with multistakeholderism in
> practice at ICANN (and elsewhere) before you jump to conclusions about its
> application.
>
>
>
> Greg Shatan
>
>
>
> *From:* discuss-bounces at 1net.org [mailto:discuss-bounces at 1net.org] *On
> Behalf Of *michael gurstein
> *Sent:* Friday, March 07, 2014 5:04 PM
> *To:* 'George Sadowsky'; discuss at 1net.org
> *Subject:* Re: [discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is
> globalized? (:-)
>
>
>
> George,
>
>
>
> A problem with this approach to the "social" is that it fails to recognize
> that many/most/all of the issues which would fall into the "social" layer
> (and many of those associated with these in other layers as well) are
> essentially "political" issues i.e. ones where there are significant
> differences not simply of (technical or other) opinion (or which could be
> easily resolvable through some sort of consensus building process). Rather
> they are issues where there is a distinct difference/conflict  of
> values/norms/interests which ultimately have to do with power and who
> controls a situation sufficiently to determine how
> rewards/benefits/outcomes are distributed.
>
>
>
> More or less subtle attempts to "depoliticize" these issues is in fact an
> attempt to divert attention away from the very real clash of interests in
> these areas. Is my digital identity something that belongs to me along with
> all of the data that accrues to that identity or is it a "profile" that
> belongs to Google where they can use that as a basis to slice and dice all
> the attributable data and then sell it on as a means to
> manage/manipulate/market me in the digital marketplace? This isn't a
> "technical" question (nor a "social" question whatever that could be)
> rather it is a "political" question which could become the basis for
> mobilization, political organizing, political contestation (one can presume
> that Google et al will not want their "ownership" of my digital identity to
> be transferred back to me) and ultimately clashes of political opinion out
> of which policy would emerge where the (monopoly) power of the State would
> of necessity be used to enforce the distribution/redistribution of
> benefits/determination of relative positions and so on. .
>
>
>
> And I'm not sure what a Mulstatkeholderist approach can contribute here.
> I don't see that a "consensus" position is either possible nor necessarily
> desirable--what kind of consensus position could a Google sign on to in the
> case I've just pointed. I for one wouldn't particularly want the range of
> options to be considered in the political/policy forum to be subject to a
> veto by Google as would presumably be required by a MSist approach with
> consensus outputs. Similarly even entering into the MSist context would to
> my mind be disempowering in an instance such as this given the depth of
> resources--human, financial, political/influential which a Google could toss
> at the issue and which would in an enforced MSist (and regrettably it seems
> in the broader political contexts as well), be effectively and practically
> overwhelming.
>
>
>
> Mike
>
>
>
> *From:* discuss-bounces at 1net.org [mailto:discuss-bounces at 1net.org<discuss-bounces at 1net.org>]
> *On Behalf Of *George Sadowsky
> *Sent:* Friday, March 07, 2014 10:37 AM
> *To:* discuss at 1net.org List
> *Subject:* [discuss] Will there be life on 1net after IANA is globalized?
> (:-)
>
>
>
> All,
>
>
>
> *Purpose: What topics in Internet governance should 1net focus upon?*
>
>
>
> Discussion on this list has focused heavily on the future of IANA, as well
> as on human rights issues.  Those are certainly appropriate topics for the
> Brazil meeting, but if 1net is to have a longer life, then there may well
> be other topics included in Internet governance that do merit attention.
>
>
>
> *Context*
>
>
>
> I'd like to talk about this more after introducing a couple of diagrams
> and some text from a publication forthcoming in I/S: A Journal of Law and
> Policy for the Information Society   (www.is-journal.org)  It is titled
> "Internet governance is out Shared Responsibility," by Vint Cerf, {Patrick
> Ryan, and Max Senges.  I take the following from a draft version of the
> paper, subject to final edits.  In my view, it's an excellent paper and
> should be read by anyone involved in Internet governance discussions.
>
>
>
> Among other things, the authors propose a layering of issues in Internet
> governance according to their relative position between strictly technical
> and strictly social.  A number of such models have been proposed.  One
> proposed earlier on this list by Brian Carpenter, and augmented by a set of
> his slides, was an extremely good and thorough exposition of this concept.
>  ISOC has published something similar, using a different approach to
> displaying the results.
>
>
>
> The paper proposes adding a social layer to the normal stack of issues, as
> in the chart below.  I believe that the specific issues listed are meant to
> be examples, because they are certainly not exhaustive of the issues at any
> of the four layers.  Of course, many problems in this space do not live
> exclusively in just one layer, but 'bleed' somewhat into adjacent layers.
>
>
>
>             <image001.png>
>
>
>
>             Illustration 1 - Social Layer Added to the Established Layered
> Model
>
>                                                  of Internet Governance
>
>
>
>
>
> The authors state:
>
>
>
> "We provide this conceptualization in order to trigger discussion about
> which institutions and stakeholder groups should legitimately be involved
> in which Internet policy issues. Put differently, we believe that it will be
>
> beneficial to the operation of the whole online ecosystem if the mandates
> of institutions are mapped and clarified with regard to their relevance in
> steering Internet governance practices and policymaking."
>
>
>
> "Hence, Illustration 2 shows a schematic example of mapping of
> institutions with relevant mandates overlaid on the layers of Internet
> governance.  Here we show the IGF is positioned in the center as it has no
> decision-making mandate itself but is instead, it is positioned to
> facilitate and moderate said decision making to take place elsewhere. In
> Clark's terminology, at the IGF, we're separating the "tussles" in a forum
> where they can be analyzed in workshops and discussion sessions and then
> brought back to the various other forums for decisions."
>
>
>
>
>
> <image002.png>
>
>
>
>
>
> This approach to defining shared responsibility for Internet governance is
> not new.  ICANN has published its view of this, and a extraordinarily good
> and thorough presentation of analysis of this type has been made by David
> Souter and is well worth reading.  In the above display, national
> governments and their various agencies are totally missing, and that seems
> to be to be a fundamental flaw, but one that can be easily corrected.
>
>
>
> *The space of Internet governance issues*
>
>
>
> The 1net discussions until now have focused primarily upon Internet naming
> and numbering (the logical layer) on the one hand, and human rights issues
> with respect to the Internet (the social layer).  This perhaps appropriate
> given the announced focus of the Brazil meeting. However, the Brazil
> meeting is just one in a number of meetings, and the purple of 1net goes
> well beyond that meeting.
>
>
>
> However, Internet governance is much more than names and addresses.  And
> in fact, in terms of stability of operations, the current use of names and
> addresses by Internet users to actually do things using the Internet is
> working remarkably well.  On the other had, most of the other examples in
> the first chart above, where the Internet is colliding with existing
> activities and changing the nature of processes, is not working nearly as
> well as we would like.  To be sure, the problems are more difficult, and
> require a different set of actors to solve, but that is no reason for not
> discussing them.  In fact, there is every reason to address this set of
> issues in order to start to solve them.
>
>
>
> Consider just the content layer for the moment.
>
>
>
> Many of the issues in this layer depend locally upon adequate legislation
> and regulation that depends on a balance between freedom for and
> restrictions on behavior and actions, both sides of the balance being
> supported by social goals.  At the international level, cooperation
> requires a minimum of agreement regarding that balance so that
> international cooperation among nation governments can take place.  What
> initiatives might make it possible to achieve both appropriate structures
> at the national level and coordinated structures at the international level
> to make this happen.  Do we need an UNCITRAL-type movement to work toward
> these goals?  Among the issues affected are:
>
>
>
>             - Addressing cybercrime activities effectively
>
>             - Understanding and ameliorating the spam situation
>
>             - ISP liability issues for content stored and/or transmitted
>
>             - Consumer protection
>
>             - Electronic document status (contracts, etc.)
>
>             - Regulatory and legislative environment -- effects on
> Internet access and pricing
>
>             - Competition policy within country and internationally
>
>             - Policy/support for community services
>
>             - Culture with respect to private data of individuals
> (tracking, advertising, etc.)
>
>             - Intellectual property rights
>
>
>
> I suspect that most everyone on this list can expand it with their own
> issue of importance.
>
>
>
> These are areas where intensive national government involvement is
> absolutely essential.  Where are these issues being discussed in a way that
> has the possibility of dramatically improving these situations?  Does the
> 1net list have any claim to, or responsibility for, addressing this area?
>  It certainly is a part of Internet governance?
>
>
>
> Bertrand de la Chapelle has been discussing the international dimension of
> these issues in his cross-boundary jurisdiction project, and he is raising
> really important issues and providing insights into the nature of this
> problem.  However, as much if not more attention needs to be paid to these
> issues at the national level.  Where are national governments being faced
> with these issues as a part of their responsibilities.  How can other
> sectors assist in making this happen?  Which other actors play a part in
> improving things, and is this happening.  How can 1net comment meaningfully
> on these issues?
>
>
>
> *Concluding ...*
>
>
>
> Using the working definition of Internet governance adopted by the WGIG in
> 2005:
>
>
>
> *            Internet governance is the development and application*
>
> *            by Governments, the private sector and civil society, *
>
> *            in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, *
>
> *            rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes *
>
> *            that shape the evolution and use of the Internet*.
>
>
>
> How might the discussions on 1net be enlarged in a productive manner to
> address some of the issue areas included in the above definition, other
> than the ones that have received extensive discussion to date?  Define this
> as problem no. 2, if you like, but its really a meta-problem.   The real
> problems are the ones listed above.
>
>
>
> George
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> * * *
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-- 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
     Dr. Alejandro Pisanty
Facultad de Química UNAM
Av. Universidad 3000, 04510 Mexico DF Mexico
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