[discuss] [IANAxfer] [ccnso-igrg] Two accountability questions - help pls- Workshop 23 - ICANN accountability

[FSP4NET]

John,

We have just discussed your message in a MYCANN Skype meeting. It 
seems that we have framework agreement with you, however with a 
simple and clearly identified disagreement concerning our different 
perspectives. This should help in clearly identifying the issues at stake.

1. The MYCANN team and its first tentative users (still at this stage 
quite intermixed with the MYCANN reflection small group) want to 
emphasize that in its opinion the situation is not black and white.

We are in an NTIACANN radically monopolistic (cf. Ivan Illich) 
situation that is to slowly evolve due to the respective power and 
strategies of the different internet global communities documented, 
but not identified, by IAB, IEEE, IETF, ISOC, W3C, RIRs, and ICANN as 
benefiting humanity (RFC 6852).

In the resulting semi-fragmented internet situation, MYCANN is only 
an initiative to help the emergence of a Libre IUser global 
community, aside from the Apple, Google, ICANN, Microsoft, etc. 
global communities. Most of them are rooted in the users operating 
systems, ICANN and IUsers are in the network interoperating approaches.


>At 00:09 10/09/2014, John Curran wrote:
>In the situation where IANA is a contracted service, i.e. where the 
>"parties with policy
>development authority for particular registries" contract with an 
>"IANA operator" to
>maintain the those registries according to the supplied policy, then 
>the IANA operator's
>performance should be both easy to predict and manage (or the 
>contractor would very
>likely be dropped in short order for one that performed per community policy.)

Yes.

The MYCANN project addresses that hypothesis not only as a 
possibility but as a current demand of our Libre community, in 
addition to the preoccupation for a "fail safe plan for the net" 
initiated by JFC Morfin. This demand was confirmed and better 
discussed during the RMLL Montpellier meeting in July of this year.

It might boil down to their current thinking of the IANA becoming a 
protocol of information for the MDRS (metadata registry system) that 
should be the core of Libre's accomplishment of the IEN 48 second 
objective. (JFC Morfin adds the need of what he calls the M&M model, 
i.e. a technological universal version of multistakeholderism).

In their perspective, every existing and additional source of IANA 
information (including ISO, Unicode, ITU, DNS Ledgers [such as 
ICANN], etc.) are MDRS co-maintainers co/operated/assisted by 
end-user selected distributed value-added digital providers.


>This raises a separate but interconnected question about how the 
>relevant communities of interest

The MYCANN initiative's understanding is that there will be a slow 
back and forth move between the communities of commercial and 
personal interest (as is for every market). (E.g. those who are 
affected by the DNS root zone). This move will allow IUsers to test 
and decide the network perspective they want to adopt.

MYCANN does not perceive any market monopoly transferred from old 
NetSol to ICANN in that area, but rather continuity with the 
namespace initial design and RFCs. This is because it adheres to 
ICANN ICP-3 and acknowledges the quasi unlimited number of individual 
root files that the DNS software is designed for. Something that 
MUST, however (cf. ICP-3), be better documented, tested, and 
validated and deployed in a community and not in a commercially 
oriented spirit. Moreover, the current commercially motivated status 
quo/US jurisdiction strategy is going to upset States and lead to 
State protective reactions.


>  those affected by the IETF protocol parameter registries,

MYCANN addresses a situation where the IETF end to end parameters are 
encapsulated together with fringe to fringe multitechnology 
parameters, formats, protocols, etc.


>those affected by IP number resource management)

It is likely that IP addresses...

>agree to exercise their inherent authority via a particular 
>organization,  for example, the Internet protocol development 
>community via the IETF, the service provider and IP address using 
>community via the RIRs,  and the DNS community via ICANN.

and many other things should evolve toward a human/legally moderated 
neutral algorithmic form of governance.


>  am not really concerned about that question with respect to the 
> IETF, as the technical protocol parameter identifier are generally 
> not assigned to real-world things likes organizations, countries, or people,

Correct.

For the time being. Subsidiarity leads to a situation where these 
parameters will results in tables and formats that will be currently 
used by countries, languages, organizations, and people as describing 
the substance of their VGN (what MYCANN expect to be the "netlocales" 
extension of the "locale" file that it is to be prepared to adapt to).


>whereas ensuring the bodies that have policy development authority 
>for Internet names
>and numbers provide bona fide representation for their communities 
>would seem to be
>essential for moving forward.

The MYCANN assumption is that this can only happen by subsidiarity, 
i.e. that the concerned bodies' granularity is to adapt to the bona 
fide representation requirements and not the people to any globally 
unilateral conception.


>It would appear that to the extent that ICANN (and the RIRs) have 
>excellent structures for governance and accountability, then they'll 
>perform in accordance with interests of their affected communities, 
>and IANA accountability could be routine contracting.

It appears that this supposed extent is what they call the BUG (being 
unilaterally global) that leads to a BUG (business unilateral 
governance) that they do not want.


>Trying to make IANA accountability structures that address the IANA 
>operator's failure to perform is quite straightforward; it is when 
>we also try to address the possible situation of the IANA operator 
>performing exactly as directed (but somehow out of alignment with 
>served community) that designing mechanisms for accountability 
>becomes rather challenging..

That mechanism is a "mutually recognized concurrent competition" of 
which the regulation is concerted via a multistakeholder process. 
MYCANN has the ambition to assist this in providing new entrants with 
the Libre tools adapted to their RFC 6852 markets that will not 
destabilize the services provided by the incumbents (cf. ICP-3)

There is an observed contention that results from the incumbents' 
lack of adequate consideration of the new entrants' specificities: it 
is named the status quo and it negatively impacts RFC 6852. This is 
what JFC Morfin started enlightening through his appeals against that 
RFC: the algorithmic governance that it establishes is only based 
upon aggregated economic constraints instead of being people centered 
(as per the WSIS consensus).

The NTIA has also identified this. It has adopted a parallel approach 
that aims at a different and deliberate target: retaining market 
hegemony in completing/replacing the economic constraints by a 
ubiquitous US leadership through jurisdiction.

MYCANN is the support of a "weak to strong" mechanism that can 
balance the US attempt to perpetuate its 1980s BUG by a BUG. 
Actually, this should lead to a weak, centralized global ICANN that 
is complemented by many strong subsidiary local ICANNs.


FSP4.NET/MYCANN - Multi-Stakeholder Group
JFC Morfin as a spoke person. 
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